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Abstract 
This article seeks to examine how Kirchnerism emerged and then dominated Argentine 
politics as the most powerful strand of Peronism since the early-2000s. Based on an analysis of 
the political, socio-economic and organizational-leadership attributes of classical Peronism and 
Menemism, the major argument of this study is that Kirchnerism, with its center-left agenda, 
has attempted to reclaim traditional Peronism by highlighting its focus on political sovereignty, 
economic independence and social justice, in contrast to Menemism, which emerged as a 
neoliberal interpretation of Peronism during the 1990s. However, the Kirchnerist opposition to 
Menemism at times remained mostly rhetorical, as revealed by the key similarities between 
these two in practice. 
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1. Introduction 
After four years in opposition, Peronism is back again. As a result of the last 
general elections, held on 27 October 2019, the Peronist candidate Alberto 
Fernandez, the former Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers, defeated the current 
president, Mauricio Macri by taking over 48 percent of the votes in the first round 
(BBC, 2019; CNN, 2019). Beyond the election of Fernandez as the new president, 
these elections also produced another important result: the ex-president Cristina 
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Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-2015) now returned as the vice-president. As 
Kirchner is widely commented to be the primary force behind this electoral triumph, 
these elections are widely commented to manifest the continued relevance of 
Kirchnerism, as well as Peronism, as a political force in Argentine politics.  
As such, Peronism has once again proved its enduring strength and popularity. 
Since the rise of Colonel Juan Domingo Peron from the early-1940s, Peronism as a 
movement has set the rules of the political game in Argentina. This has reached 
such an extent that being a Peronist or not keeps standing as the primary point of 
reference when determining political allegiances. In addition, the fact that Peronist 
presidents, including Carlos Menem, Adolfo Rodriguez Saa, Eduardo Duhalde, 
Nestor Kirchner, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner and now Alberto Fernandez have 
governed the country for over a quarter century since the transition to democracy 
in 1983 may also evidence the core position of Peronism in Argentine politics.    
The centrality of Peronism in domestic politics has even led some 
commentators to identify Argentina as a “Peronist democracy”, rather than a 
delegative or hyper-presidential one (Casullo, 2014). Indeed, what is critical in 
understanding the continued dominance of Peronism is its ideologically flexible and 
politically eclectic nature, which has enabled it to adapt to changing circumstances 
(Calvo and Murillo, 2012; Szusterman, 2000; Wylde, 2010) by overcoming 
numerous challenges, such as military coups, electoral defeats and internal frictions. 
Therefore, as is the case for other cases of populism, Peronism has simultaneously 
encompassed many different, and at times clashing, factions for decades.  
Moving from this path, the main argument of this article is that Kirchnerism, 
with its center-left agenda, has attempted to reclaim classical Peronism by 
highlighting its focus on political sovereignty, economic independence and social 
justice, in contrast to Menemism, emerging as a rather neoliberal interpretation of 
Peronism during the 1990s. In other words, whilst setting its major premises, 
Kirchnerism has drawn on classical Peronism and Menemism not only as its 
historical antecedents but also as the primary points of reference, in positive and 
negative senses, respectively. However, Kirchnerism’s negative references to 
Menemism at times remained mostly rhetorical, as revealed by key similarities 
between these two in practice. Hence, designating classical Peronism and 
Menemism as the main stages that laid the ground for Kirchnerism, this article seeks 
to examine the emergence and ascendance of Kirchnerism as the most powerful 
strand of Peronism in recent decades. In this respect, the convergences and 
divergences of Kirchnerism with classical Peronism and Menemism as to the 
political, socio-economic and organizational-leadership dimensions will primarily 
be taken into account. 
Relying on theoretical scheme offered by Arnson and de la Torre (2013) that 
explains three historical waves of populism under the currents of classical populism, 
METU STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT 259 
neopopulism and radical populism, this article is divided into three main parts1. In 
the first part, classical Peronism will be analyzed as the era of classical populism in 
Argentina, based on its defining features that were constituted during three 
presidential terms of Juan Peron, alongside the brief presidency of his third wife, 
Maria Estela ‘Isabel’ Martinez de Peron2. Second, Menemism will be examined as 
the mix of ideas dominating the era of neopopulism, or neoliberal populism 
(Armony, 2005; Cammack, 2000; de la Torre, 2007; Roberts, 1995; 2007; Weyland, 
2003), in Argentina. Finally, how Kirchnerism –as a Peronist form of radical 
populism in Argentina- emerged in the shape of a “back-to-basics” movement 
within Peronism will be issued, around its convergences and divergences with 
classical Peronism and Menemism.  
2. Classical Peronism: Classical populism in Argentina 
Classical Peronism, as the Argentine form of classical populism and the 
primary guide of Kirchnerism, emerged in the course of the 1943 Coup, which 
ended the “Infamous Decade”3. Despite taking part in the new administration as the 
Minister of Labour, the closer links that Colonel Juan Peron established with the 
working class and the unions caused discontent on the part of the business sector 
and the military government. Therefore, the government arrested Peron in a bid to 
eliminate him politically. However, the support of the huge masses for Peron, as 
happened in the Plaza de Mayo on 7 October 1945, was instrumental to him finally 
being elected as the president in 1946. Peron proceeded to serve as president until 
1955, when he was ousted from the office by a military coup. After spending almost 
20 years in exile in Spain, with his movement banned by the military authorities, 
Peron returned to be elected as the president again in 1973, until his death next year. 





                                                 
1  In applying this theoretical framework to the case of Peronism, key historical events will be wielded, 
alongside the political, socio-economic and organizational attributes of the three distinct episodes of 
Peronism.  
2  Given the limited scope of the paper, only the periods during which classical Peronism was in power 
(1946-1955, 1973-1976) will be examined, without covering the phases spent in exile (1955-1973) or 
outside power (1976-1989). 
3  The Infamous Decade is a period which started with the coup d‘état in 1930 and was mostly 
characterized by corruption, economic turmoil, electoral fraud and the oppression of the working class. 
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2.1. Political dimension of classical Peronism 
It was against such a backdrop that Peronism evolved as a widely supported 
political movement. This directly impacted on the development of its political 
premises. Depending on the defense of nationalism, anti-imperialism, and a strong, 
‘pro-labor’ state, classical Peronism sought to present itself as a national ‘Third 
Position’ vis-à-vis capitalism and socialism. As President Peron explained in one 
of his speeches made in the Congress in 1948, Peronism was generally seen in the 
eyes of its supporters as “humanism in action”, and “a new political doctrine, which 
rejects all the ills of the politics of previous times” (Hellinger, 2015). In this respect, 
political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice were designated as 
three primary pillars of the “justicialist” movement.  
Emerging in response to the deep societal crisis inflicted by the Infamous 
Decade and the growing demands of the working class in the post-war period 
(Grigera, 2017: 7-8), classical Peronism thus attached large importance to the 
political incorporation of the hitherto excluded social masses, such as the organized 
labor, the poor and the dispossessed  (Arnson and de la Torre, 2013; Szusterman, 
2000). In particular, the iconic status and activities of Eva ‘Evita’ Peron opened the 
way to the active participation of women in politics.  
It was this political orientation of classical Peronism around the principles of 
political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice, alongside the 
political incorporation of the excluded masses, that would constitute the essence of 
Kirchnerism’s political discourse decades later.   
2.2. Socio-economic dimension of classical Peronism 
Just like other variants of classical populism, classical Peronism emerged in 
the 1930s’ Argentina when the oligarchic elites started to lose control due to the 
fast-paced industrialization and urbanization processes, which led to a new urban 
mass sector that was disposed to political mobilization (Roberts, 1995: 113). In such 
a constellation, classical Peronism moved to establish a corporatist coalition on the 
societal level mainly between the industrialists and the workers. According to this 
formula, under the supervision of the pro-labor state, classical Peronism would host 
a popular alliance between the industrialists and the workers in a conflict-free 
manner. Through this way, classical Peronism aimed to act on behalf of the poor 
and the workers, known as “the shirtless ones” (los descamisadosa) (Baer, 2014). 
In line with this corporatist logic, classical Peronism resorted to strong state 
intervention in the economy, in an effort to achieve economic sovereignty and 
egalitarian redistribution of income and wealth. This means that the state would act 
for national progress, as well as for the interests of the labor and the needy masses.  
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In order to achieve the first goal, a strategy of ‘national developmentalism’ 
was adopted, based on the commitment to developing a national industry and 
supporting domestic industrialists through different schemes (Arnson and de la 
Torre, 2013; Cammack, 2000). This emphasis on national developmentalism 
automatically shifted the center of gravity from the export-oriented growth model 
to the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) model.  
For the second goal, classical Peronist administration introduced several 
social programs that benefited the working class, trade unions, and the 
disadvantaged. In the context of the ‘welfare state’ structure, albeit different from 
its European equivalents, many progressive social programs such as universal free 
education, compulsory social security and subsidized housing were applied.  
In sum, despite noticeable differences, the attempt of classical Peronism to 
form a historic, multi-class coalition between business and labor and its social 
welfare-oriented approach later inspired the Kirchnerist movement while shaping 
its socio-economic priorities. 
2.3.Organizational-leadership dimension of classical Peronism 
The organizational-leadership dimension of classical Peronism was 
substantially influenced by its political and socio-economic aspects. On the one 
hand, like other cases of classical populism, classical Peronism was thus primarily 
about the top-down political mobilization of mass constituencies by a charismatic 
leader, that is Peron, through defying “the elite” on behalf of a designated pueblo, 
or “the people” (Roberts, 2007: 6). By combining nationalist appeals and an anti-
oligarchic discourse adhered to state-led industrialization, workers’ rights, and 
social welfare reforms (Roberts, 2007: 8), classical Peronism adopted a populist 
discourse polarizing its societal support base against internal and external ‘foes’. 
With some changes in the composition of the targeted groups, this anti-oligarchic 
rhetoric kept on being utilized not only by Carlos Saul Menem but also by Nestor 
Kirchner and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner during their presidential terms.  
On the other hand, given the wide spectrum of political and ideological 
sentiments that Peronism encompasses, what was principally important for the 
classical Peronist organization was the undisputable leadership of Juan Peron. In 
this regard, the charismatic and personalist leadership of Peron functioned as sort 
of a common denominator among all the constitutive elements of the Peronist bloc. 
However, this over-emphasis on Peron’s leadership resulted in the PJ (Partido 
Justicialista – Justicialist Party) turning out to be a rather weakly institutionalized 
party, which was principally conceived as an ‘electoral machine’ in conveying the 
Peronist messages to the masses (Herrera, 2007).  
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In addition, the unifying character of Peron’s leadership eroded particularly 
on his third presidential term in 1973-4, as witnessed in the bloody conflicts 
happening between the left- and right-wing Peronists, which reached a climax in 
the Ezeiza Massacre in 19734. Despite not happening at such a high level, the 
internal frictions, as well as the large devotion to the ‘leader’, continued to 
characterize the later phases of the Peronist movement, as seen in the denunciation 
of Menemism by Kirchnerism.  
3. Menemism: Neopopulist update in Peronism 
Menemism, the antecedent and major ‘negative’ point of reference of 
Kirchnerism, is widely considered to fall into the category of neopopulism, or 
neoliberal populism. At the onset, populism, together with statism and nationalism, 
were assumed to gradually eclipse with the rise of neoliberalism (Roberts, 2007: 4). 
However, as recognized later, neoliberalism proved to facilitate the adjustment of 
populism to changing circumstances rather than to stimulate its decline (Roberts, 
1995: 112). In this vein, framed as an ‘attempted marriage of populism and 
neoliberalism’ (Knight, 1998), neopopulism is primarily exemplified by the policy 
practices of Menemism in Argentina, as well as Fujimorism in Peru (Cammack, 
2000: 159). 
Though acknowledged to appear with the start of Menem’s presidency in 
1989, the historical background of Menemism is possible to be traced back to the 
early-1970s, the third presidential term of Peron. This is precisely because classical 
Peronism per se showed signs of remarkable change when Peron was back from 
exile to be re-elected as president in 1973. Though the primary attributes of classical 
Peronism were mostly preserved, President Peron, for instance, was placing more 
emphasis on anti-communism, at a time when the left and right-wing Peronists were 
clashing, alongside being more open to economic liberalism. This attitudinal 
change even intensified during the presidency of Isabel Peron in 1974-1976, which 
was characterized by widespread social unrest, state suppression on the political 
left, high levels of inflation and an orthodox economic policy (Horowitz, 1999: 38). 
When the 1990s came, the international setting had radically changed, with 
the bipolar Cold War order ending and the neoliberal globalization process being 
fully underway. In such circumstances, Menemism rose as a new form of Peronism 
that co-existed with, and even implemented, neoliberal structural adjustment 
                                                 
4  The Ezeiza Massacre took place on 20 June 1973 near the Ezeiza International Airport in Buenos Aires, 
where the anti-communist, right-wing Peronist groups targeted the left-wing Peronist groups, such as 
Montoneros, which were to welcome the return of Juan Peron from 18-year-long exile in Spain. 
According to the official figures, the attacks caused 13 deaths, with over 300 people wounded, but the 
number is generally acknowledged to be much higher.  
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reforms (Roberts, 2007: 4). Though evoking the images of classical Peronist 
leadership, Menemist policies sharply diverged from the statist and economically 
redistributive emphases of classical Peronism (Roberts, 1995: 82). Therefore, as 
exemplified by Menemism itself, there exists a scholarly consensus on that 
neoliberalism and populism have some unexpected affinities in the context of 
neopopulism (de la Torre, 2007; Knight, 1998; Richardson, 2009; Roberts, 1995; 
Weyland, 1996; 1998; 1999; 2001; 2003). To put it another way, Menemism, like 
other variants of neopopulism, marks more than a historical accident or a ‘marriage 
of convenience’ between neoliberalism and populism, but was enforced by a 
“seemingly odd, but mutual attraction” (Weyland, 1996: 6). As it stands, it is likely 
to observe how neoliberalism and populism joined forces under the framework of 
neopopulism, in the particular context of the political, socio-economic and 
organizational-leadership dimensions of Menemism. 
3.1. Political dimension of Menemism 
Menemism gained power at a time when both the country and the Peronist 
movement were in disarray. In the first democratic elections after the end of the 
military dictatorship in 1983, the PJ lost to the UCR (Union Civica Radical - 
Radical Civic Union) candidate, Raul Alfonsin. However, in the face of the 
escalating political and socio-economic crisis throughout the 1980s, President 
Alfonsin had to call an early general election in 1989. Throughout the election 
campaign, Menem pledged to the classical Peronist economic and social policies. 
However, once elected to the office, Menem made a dramatic U-turn and launched 
a neoliberal policy program, as inspired by Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the 
US (Horowitz, 1999; Weyland, 2003; Wylde, 2010). In contrast to classical 
Peronism, which promoted itself as a solution to the failed liberal institutions, 
Menemism thus favored neoliberalism as the major antidote to the ongoing crisis 
(Cammack, 2000: 159). 
The purported affinities between neopopulism (Menemism) and 
neoliberalism came into the fore regarding their politically symbiotic relationship. 
Sharing an opportunistic and manipulative nature, both Menemism and 
neoliberalism aimed to move pragmatically so as to adapt to new challenges 
(Armony, 2005: 5). This means that whilst Menemism drew on populist devices to 
gain consent for neoliberal market reforms, the neoliberal attacks on the established 
political and economic interests strengthened Menemism’s hand in power 
(Weyland, 1996; 2003). In other words, the personalist and plebiscitarian strategy 
of Menemism based on political deinstitutionalization functioned as a 
“superstructure” that cleared the way for the imposition of controversial neoliberal 
reforms (Armony, 2005; Roberts, 1995). In turn, neoliberalism provided many 
advantages to Menem governments, not least as to implementing the neopopulist 
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policy agenda (Armony, 2005; Weyland, 2003). After all, whilst President Menem 
relied on the Minister of Economy, Domingo Cavallo to guarantee economic 
stability for re-election, Cavallo needed President Menem's command over political 
support for implementing market-oriented reforms (Weyland, 1996: 6). Later, this 
politically beneficial relationship between Menemism and neoliberalism would be 
harshly criticized by the Kirchnerist leadership. 
3.2. Socio-economic dimension of Menemism 
With regard to Menemism’s socio-economic premises, the story was more or 
less similar to its political dimension. As said before, despite running on a classical 
Peronist platform and promising huge wage increase (salariazoa) and a “productive 
revolution” in the run-up to the 1989 elections, Menem dramatically adopted a 
neoliberal agenda when elected to the office (Horowitz, 1999; Scherlis, 2008; 
Szusterman, 2000). Resorting to neoliberal economic prescriptions, such as export-
oriented growth strategy and cuts in welfare spending, the Menemist economic 
policies principally set out to provide an effective answer to the demise of the 
developmentalist state (Cammack, 2000; Roberts, 1995; Ronchi, 2011). Therefore, 
with reference to his abandoning the classical Peronist policies of protectionism and 
state interventionism in favor of neoliberal economic policies, Menem was recalled 
as a “Peronist president without Peronism” throughout his term in 1989-1999. 
Beyond representing a more neoliberal variant of Peronism, Menemism also 
rested upon new social bases. On the one side, Menemism, like neoliberalism, 
sought to primarily appeal to the politically demobilized and unorganized labor in 
the informal sector (Armony, 2005; Roberts, 1995; 2007; Weyland, 1996). 
Moreover, the rural and urban poor were covered amongst the constituencies of 
Menemism (Szusterman, 2000, Weyland, 1996; 2003), alongside some elements of 
the middle class (Wylde, 2010: 5). This automatically translated into strained 
relations with the organized labor and trade unions, such as CGT (Confederacion 
General del Trabajo - General Confederation of Labor), even at the expense of 
damaging the classical Peronist alliance of industrialists-workers (Wylde, 2010: 
14). 
On the other side, the Menemist administration developed closer links with 
the business sector in the economic policy-making (Wylde, 2010: 18). This 
seemingly contradictory multi-class coalition not only extended the personalist 
policy style of Menemism, it as well undermined the formal policy-making 
procedures (Sushant, 2012; Weyland, 2000). In a similar vein, the selective 
incorporation of some classes worked to prevent the emergence of a united labor 
opposition against the neoliberal measures of Menemism (Roberts, 1995: 111). 
Depending on this multi-class coalition on a societal level, Menemist 
economic policies were primarily rooted in the Washington Consensus (Iglesias, 
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2015; Ronchi, 2011; Szusterman, 2000; Wylde, 2010). Developing closer relations 
with the international capitalist organizations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), Argentina under the Menemist administration turned into a ‘poster 
boy’ of the neoliberal policies (Grigera, 2017: 7).  
According to Menem, the market stood as a key aspect of the social life, with 
globalization representing “an opportunity for economic development”, both of 
which would ultimately serve the interests of “Great Argentina” (Armony, 2005: 
12). During Menem’s time in office, the Argentine economy was drastically opened 
to global competition (Horowitz, 1999: 41). In this regard, the neoliberal economic 
project of Menemism mainly rested on market liberalization, trade liberalization, 
and most importantly, privatization of key state assets (Arnson and de la Torre, 
2013). Put simply, Menem was principally concerned with ensuring 
macroeconomic stability by controlling inflation through the Convertibility regime 
and increasing efficiency through economic liberalization and privatization (Wylde, 
2010: 14). The structural measures applied by the government involved lowering 
barriers to foreign trade and investment, tightening fiscal policy, limiting the 
provision of social services and discouraging labor strikes (Weyland, 2000). With 
the implementation of a radical privatization program, a broad range of state-owned 
enterprises, such as oil, communications, railroad, energy and airlines, were 
privatized (Horowitz, 1999; Ronchi, 2011). 
In the short run, those neoliberal reforms achieved some success in providing 
economic recovery, by boosting the economic growth and investment, along with 
drops in poverty and unemployment levels (Szusterman, 2000: 201). Nevertheless, 
other than remaining mostly temporary, those measures fell short of permanently 
solving the problems of social inequality and income injustice. Consequently, 
during the domestic turbulence of 2001-2002, the neoliberal economic policies 
applied during Menem’s presidency were held responsible, inter alia, for the 
financial collapse of Argentina, not least by the Kirchnerist movement. 
3.3. Organizational-leadership dimension of Menemism 
Contrary to its political and socio-economic traits, the organizational-
leadership dimension of Menemism remained loyal to the classical Peronist, 
‘caudillo’ style of leadership, just like Kirchnerism later. That is, though failing to 
“reproduce the substance” of classical Peronism in other respects, Menemism 
preserved the rhetoric and rituals of the Peronist tradition in its leadership patterns 
(Armony, 2005; Schamis, 2006). Therefore, even when implementing the 
Washington Consensus reforms, the Menemist leadership employed a populist 
discourse resting on the familiar themes, such as “the people”, nationalism and 
economic redistribution (Grigera, 2017: 5). 
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However, what distinguished Menemism from classical Peronism in utilizing 
this discourse was its main purpose: to promote and justify the neoliberal market 
reforms. Menem tried to convince the Argentine people of the necessity of those 
reforms to both handle the new challenges of the global era and transform the 
bureaucratically corrupt and ineffective state structure (Sushant, 2012). After all, 
those reforms launched by Menem would primarily serve the “common good” in 
the first place. 
To this end, like its classical Peronist antecedent, Menemism resorted to an 
exclusionary discourse that centered on a contradiction between “the people” and 
the “power bloc”. Now, though, the composition of the power bloc was slightly 
different: the political class and other established elites, the so-called privileged, 
better-off social strata, and the institutionalized forms of political representation 
(Weyland, 1996: 3). In line with this strategy of political deinstitutionalization, the 
Menemist leadership tried to form a direct relationship with its social support base 
by bypassing the established parties and interest organizations (Roberts, 1995; 
Ronchi, 2011; Weyland, 2003). For instance, President Menem frequently bypassed 
the Congress by issuing presidential decrees and intervened in the Supreme Court 
(Horowitz, 1999; Weyland, 1996). 
At that point, what is crucial to note is that the affinities between Menemism 
and neoliberalism, particularly as to their shared anti-organizational bent (Weyland, 
2003: 1098), played a crucial role here, as well. In other words, in an effort to 
protect the market from the effect of the special interests or rent-seeking groups, 
neoliberalism gave consent to an unmediated relationship between the neopopulist 
Menemist leadership and the masses (Armony, 2005: 12). 
However, as the 1990s came to a close, the once solid link between 
Menemism and neoliberalism weakened (Weyland, 2003: 1113), with Menemism 
losing credibility both within the Peronist movement and across the country. The 
ten-year-reign of Menemism ended with the electoral defeat encountered in the 
1999 elections, which saw the Radical candidate, Fernando de la Rua elected as the 
new president. 
4. Kirchnerism: Return to classical Peronist roots? 
Following the neopopulist era, radical populism emerged during the late-
1990s as a reaction to the neoliberal practices of neopopulism, based on the defense 
of political independence, economic protectionism and nationalization (Arnson and 
de la Torre, 2013).  
Kirchnerism, the contemporary radical populist brand of Peronism in 
Argentina, has similarly adhered to economic redistribution and larger political 
inclusion. Seeking to revive the populist traditions of Peronism (Roberts, 2007: 12) 
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via its left-leaning agenda, Kirchnerism developed its political and socio-economic 
strategies around an exact rejection of Menemism’s neoliberal legacy.  
Building on this platform, Kirchnerismo has dominated the political 
landscape in Argentina since 2003. This impact achieved an unprecedented point 
even exceeding the party divisions, in that certain groups from rival parties such as 
the UCR, PS (Partido Socialista - Socialist Party), and CPA (Partido Comunista de 
la Argentina - Communist Party of Argentina) identified themselves with 
Kirchnerism5. Under the presidencies of “both Kirchners”, Kirchnerism further 
consolidated its hold in power in a bid to realize its policy agenda.  
4.1. Kirchnerism’s rise to power 
An analysis of the political, socio-economic and organizational-leadership 
attributes of Kirchnerism, related to classical Peronism and Menemism, would be 
incomplete without an account of its political ascendance. This is because the 
primary reasons underlying Kirchnerism’s rise to power in the wake of the 2001-
2002 crisis give crucial clues about how Kirchnerism has related to classical 
Peronism and Menemism in setting its overall agenda. As such, it is likely to 
identify three primary reasons for the political ascendance of Kirchnerism.  
First, the apparent failure of Menemist neoliberal policies led to the rising 
popularity of Kirchnerism within the Peronist movement. Despite launched with 
very high expectations, Menem’s neoliberal reforms were popularly believed to 
bring nothing but rising socio-economic inequalities and the 2001-2002 economic 
crisis. Indeed, the policies applied during Menem’s presidency never fully 
resonated with the Peronist movement, which is conventionally characterized by 
state-centrism and economic protectionism on behalf of the labor and the poor 
(Scherlis, 2008: 592). Therefore, by the time the PJ had an electoral defeat against 
the Radicals in the 1999 elections, it was already time for change.  
Consequently, Kirchnerism managed to establish itself as a plausible option 
to lead Peronism at this critical conjuncture, not least based on its anti-neoliberal 
agenda. As is well known, throughout the history of Peronism, it was likely to 
regroup under a newly ‘shining’ Peronist clique after the leadership of the 
previously dominant group fades following an internal splinter or a nation-wide 
failure (Fernandez, 2015). Therefore, akin to Menemism which once dominated the 
Peronist movement by undermining the classical Peronist principles of economic 
protectionism and state interventionism, Kirchnerism pursued the same path, albeit 
against Menemism this time. 
                                                 
5  The supporters of Kirchnerism within the UCR were called radicales K, while the Socialist supporters 
were known as socialistas K. 
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Relatedly, the chaotic environment arising from the 2001-2002 crisis marks 
the second reason behind the rise of Kirchnerism. Marking the biggest crisis in the 
recent Argentine history, this crisis led to a long period of domestic turmoil that 
saw a default on the country’s foreign debt and the expropriation of bank savings 
in foreign currencies, alongside a deep crisis of governance marked by the 
succession of five presidents in a month (Grigera, 2017: 7).  
In what follows, whilst struggling to tackle the negative implications of the 
crisis, Argentinians lost almost all their faith in the established institutions of the 
political system, not least the political parties. At the height of the internal chaos, 
the Argentine streets were full of protestors blaming all politicians and political 
parties for this economic catastrophe and calling them to quit with the slogan “Que 
se vayan todos!” (“All of them must go!”) (Grigera, 2017; Scherlis, 2008). As such, 
the popular confidence in political parties among Argentine people declined to a 
historical low of 4 percent in 2002 from the level of 29 percent in 1997. Likewise, 
while the rate of the Argentines declaring support for the government was 20 
percent in 1996, this declined to as low as 7 percent as of 2002 (see Table 1)6. As 
another sign of the crisis of representation, in the 2001 midterm elections, 22 
percent of the electorate cast blank or spoiled votes to show their frustration 
(Levitsky and Murillo, 2008: 22). Apparently, people were looking for a reliable 
political alternative, other than neoliberalism, that would govern the country and 
restore public trust in the democratic system again.  
In such a sober atmosphere, Kirchnerism offered some reasonable solutions 
towards a host of political, economic, and social problems that paralyzed the entire 
country. Through its left-wing Peronist discourse, Kirchnerism placed large 
emphasis both on the labor force and state intervention in the economy for the 
benefit of the domestic industry and employment (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014: 47), in the 
sense of classical Peronism. Acknowledging the political reality that “the essence 
of Peronism is the workers and to deny the workers is to deny Peronism”, 
Kirchnerism thus frequently highlighted the salience of the traditional Peronist 
coalition of industrialists-workers (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 152).  
  
                                                 
6  For the stated years, the rates of popular confidence in the political parties and government include the 
answers of “a lot of confidence” and “some confidence”, as shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1 
Rates of Public Trust in Political Parties and Government 
Source: All the data for the specified years have been retrieved from Latinobarometro 
(http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp). 
Note: The responses of "No answer/Refused" and "Don't know" have been excluded. 
 
In an attempt to restore faith in political institutions, both Nestor Kirchner and 
Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner moved to break the popular conception that political 
parties and the government mainly heed the interests of the international creditors 
and global markets, not of the Argentinians (Levitsky and Murillo, 2008: 22). To 
this end, both presidents launched high-profile battles against the entities that were 
considered to restrain the government’s room for manoeuvre, such as the IMF, 
foreign and domestic capitalists, bondholders and the military (Levitsky and 
Murillo, 2008: 22). Despite criticized for the personalist tendencies of both 
presidents, those attempts resulted in a remarkable rise in the general levels of 
popular trust in the political institutions. The overall confidence in Argentine 
political parties steadily grew, first to 14 percent in 2007, and then to 25 percent in 
2013, coupled with the rising level of trust in government, first to 35 percent in 
2007, and then to 44 percent in 2013 (see Table 1). 
As the third and final factor behind Kirchnerism’s success can be given the 
conjunctural rise of the Left across Latin America, epitomized as the ‘Pink Tide’ 
(Grigera, 2017; Iglesias, 2015; Roberts, 2007; Wylde, 2010). At the beginning of 
the 2000s, all the Latin American countries were experiencing a “leftist 
renaissance” (Oxhorn, 2003: 9). This region-wide tendency saw several leftist 
candidates consecutively take presidencies in many Latin American countries, 
including Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, and Brazil. As part of this leftist/progressive 





Political Parties Government 
1997 2002 2007 2013 1996 2002 2007 2013 
A lot of confidence 4% 0% 1% 4% 5% 1% 7% 14% 
Some confidence 25% 4% 13% 21% 15% 6% 28% 30% 
Little confidence 32% 15% 39% 37% 32% 18% 39% 29% 
No confidence at all 35% 80% 47% 37% 45% 74% 26% 26% 
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4.2. What Kirchnerism stands for? 
In light of the main premises of classical Peronism and Menemism, 
Kirchnerism7 developed a policy framework as a response to the political turbulence 
of the early-2000s. As to its political, socio-economic and organizational-leadership 
dimensions, Kirchnerism reclaimed classical Peronism by designating itself as a 
back-to-roots movement. In this respect, Menemism emerged as another primary 
point of reference, albeit in a negative sense, for Kirchnerism. This means that while 
attempting to revive the “justicialist” legacy of classical Peronism with a left-wing 
agenda, Kirchnerism tried to break away from the neoliberal legacy of Menemism. 
However, as proven by some striking similarities between these two, the Kirchnerist 
rejection of Menemism sometimes remained mostly rhetorical.  
4.2.1. Political dimension of Kirchnerism 
The primary political motivation of Kirchnerism was to represent a political 
alternative to the predominant neoliberal model. As neoliberalism laid the ground 
for neopopulist Menemism, the idea of ‘post-neoliberalism’ gave essence to the 
radical populist understanding of Kirchnerism (Wylde, 2016: 322). Therefore, in an 
attempt to go beyond Menemism, Kirchnerism attempted to revitalize the long-
forgotten roots of classical Peronism in the 2000s’ Argentina. 
One part of this political strategy was to highlight the convergences with the 
political dimension of classical Peronism. Given that the wide-ranging political and 
economic exclusion of the masses and the institutional weaknesses that led to 
classical Peronism similarly sparked the rise of Kirchnerism in the post-neoliberal 
era (de la Torre, 2007; Roberts, 2007), Kirchnerism moved to revive the political 
traditions of classical Peronism. For instance, Kirchnerism often referred to three 
main pillars of classical Peronism, including political independence, economic 
sovereignty and social justice. Moreover, on the symbolic level, Nestor Kirchner 
and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner were popularly conceived to resemble the duo 
of Juan Peron-Eva Peron, in terms of their similar political capacities to generate 
change. In particular, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner relied on the legacy of Eva 
Peron for further incorporation of women into politics.  
In the same vein, Kirchnerism increasingly engaged with the defense of 
human rights issues on the political arena. Addressing the human rights violations 
committed during the military dictatorship of the ‘National Reorganization Period’, 
                                                 
7  It must be noted that despite generally following the same policy line, there exist some differences 
between the presidencies of Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner (2007-
2015), not least as to the conflictual relations with labor and business interests since 2007.  
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popularly called the “Dirty War”8, Nestor and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
openly challenged the impunities provided by the previous Alfonsin and Menem 
governments to the military figures. As a result, a number of military officers were 
tried before courts and punished for the crimes against humanity. 
Another part of this political strategy was the denouncement of Menemism. 
As the first step, Nestor Kirchner built his own position and authority within the 
Peronist movement by attacking Menem’s legacy (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 160). 
In later phases, Kirchnerism as a movement broadly positioned itself against 
Menemism, with the primary goal of realizing the change from the neoliberal model 
to a more state-centric, ‘neo-developmentalist’ model (Wylde, 2014; 2016). 
Following the collapse of the neoliberal experiment of Menemism, what 
Kirchnerism aimed was to pull the Peronist movement back to its nationalist and 
statist roots (Roberts, 2007: 12).  
However, for some views, Kirchnerism did not offer a new political model, 
but just a reformulation of the Peronist populism (Iglesias, 2015: 65). Accordingly, 
even the neo-developmental regime Kirchnerism sought to establish simultaneously 
arose from and within the neoliberal logic (Wylde, 2016: 324). To put it another 
way, because of its key elements of continuity with classical Peronism, Kirchnerism 
is undoubtedly Peronist; but its unique blend of “national relationships and policies 
with a distinct international strategy based around reducing debt, a reformulation of 
the relationship with the IMF, and political preference for the national industry” 
exclusively renders Kirchnerism a “21st-century Peronism for a globalizing world”, 
as Wylde (2010; 2011; 2014) notes.    
4.2.2. Socio-economic dimension of Kirchnerism  
The socio-economic dimension accounts for the raison d’étre of Kirchnerism 
because most of its pledges were concentrated in this area. Motivated by the central 
goal of offering working solutions to a range of socio-economic problems in the 
post-crisis Argentina, Kirchnerism adopted a neo-developmentalist model, which 
was committed to economic recovery, alongside reducing poverty and inequality 
(Wylde, 2016: 323). 
At the time Nestor Kirchner was elected president in 2003, the Argentine 
economy was in a desperate situation, as explained above. In addition to the high 
levels of unemployment and low levels of economic growth, Argentina was under 
the pressure of many international debtors. At the societal level, people were 
                                                 
8  The Dirty War refers to the era of military dictatorship in 1976-83, when a broad range of political 
dissidents including students, trade unionists, journalists, political activists and left-wing Peronists were 
persecuted through different means by the military junta. According to the official figures, over 30.000 
people “disappeared” during this period.    
272 Uğur Tekiner 
dealing with the political and social exclusions caused by the neoliberal policies (de 
la Torre, 2007: 394). Against such a backdrop did Kirchnerism emerge as a 
plausible alternative with its centre-left, neo-developmentalist agenda, which rested 
on group solidarity, collective action and an interventionist state (Roberts, 2007: 
11). 
As part of the Kirchnerist attempts to revive the classical Peronist roots, the 
historic Peronist coalition of industrialists-workers, which was impaired during the 
Menem years, was placed huge emphasis. To manage relations with labor and 
business, an approach of “segmented neo-corporatism” was adopted (Wylde, 2010; 
2014; 2016), alongside offering broad benefits to these two groups (Richardson, 
2009: 229). Moreover, in stark contrast with Menemism, Nestor Kirchner gave 
special emphasis to increased cooperation with the organized labor, based on the 
logic of nationalist/statist development (Wylde, 2010: 14). Nevertheless, as the 
economy deteriorated with the Great Recession (2008-9), those organic links with 
organized labor and domestic business were strained during the term of Cristina 
Fernandez de Kirchner. 
However, there was more to the socio-economic support base of Kirchnerism. 
Beyond these two elements of the historic Peronist coalition, Kirchnerism also 
relied on the support of the informal sector workers and the unemployed (the 
piqueteros), the poor, trade unions, agro-industrialists and even some big companies 
(Richardson, 2009; Wylde, 2012; 2014; 2016). Besides, Kirchnerism appealed to 
certain middle-class elements under both presidents (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 
151), not least due to the consumer boom produced by the macroeconomic 
stabilization (Wylde, 2010: 5). Given that those middle-class groups were also a 
part of the Menemist support base during the 1990s, this points to a common 
characteristic between Kirchnerism and Menemism, albeit a difference with 
classical Peronism. 
Stemming from its anti-neoliberal stance, Kirchnerism came up with a socio-
economic policy agenda that mainly revolved around fair redistribution of income 
and nationalization. In the wake of the 2001-2002 crisis, Nestor Kirchner defaulted 
on the national debt, which freed an important share of the national budget from 
interest repayments (Grigera, 2017: 8), openly defied the IMF and international 
creditors, and restored some price controls and state ownership of public utilities 
(Roberts, 2007: 12). Moreover, both Nestor and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
aimed to end the Menemist wage-depressing policies by pushing for a series of 
minimum-wage increases, encouraging unions’ collective bargaining power and 
eliminating the formal restrictions on the collective labor strikes. Meanwhile, huge 
expenditure in public works and a range of public subsidies fostered the economic 
activity, alongside a favorable exchange rate that boosted export-led industrial 
manufacturing (Calvo&Murillo, 2012: 151-2). In the end, Kirchnerism was 
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conceived as a pro-labor strategy for economic growth based on selective 
protectionism and state interventionism in the sense of classical Peronism, which 
provided notable post-crisis growth through a mix of domestic policy and eligible 
international circumstances (Aytaç and Öniş, 2014; Wylde, 2014). 
Though the anti-neoliberal Kirchnerist policy agenda seems to be 
substantially different from Menemism, they have some marked similarities in this 
realm, too. For instance, despite challenging many entrepreneurs with an anti-
privatization manner, Nestor Kirchner simultaneously stressed the need for “serious 
capitalism” (capitalismo en serio). This entailed the relative acceptance of some 
neoliberal principles, such as sound fiscal policy, budget surplus, steady inflation 
and foreign investment9. Therefore, whilst applying the redistributive policies, 
President Nestor Kirchner concurrently aimed to achieve sustained economic 
growth, along with avoiding hyperinflationary and balance-of-payments crises 
(Richardson, 2009: 229). In addition, the well-known emphasis on the export-
oriented growth scheme appeared as another commonality between Kirchnerism 
and Menemism. 
The social support scheme of Kirchnerism represents another area of 
similarity with Menemism. In an effort to complement the economic policies, the 
Kirchnerist government applied a wide range of social policies10. However, in 
contrast to classical Peronism, which provided social protection through clientelism 
for the urban working class, Kirchnerism much more maintained the Menemist 
tradition of the safety-net model of social welfare, which could target the worst 
manifestations of poverty instead of applying a more systematic approach (Wylde, 
2014: 14). In other words, representing a rather financialized approach to social 
welfare, the safety-net model of neoliberalism, which rested on Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) (Grigera, 2017: 9) to the poor, kept on functioning as the primary 
means of social support during the era of Kirchnerism (Wylde, 2014, 197). 
At that point, some qualifications need to be made about the differing 
approach assumed during the presidency of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. When 
elected president in 2007, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner pledged to deepen the 
redistributionist policies applied by her predecessor (Calvo and Murillo, 2012: 
157). However, in contrast to Nestor Kirchner’s presidency, Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner faced more challenging conditions in the national and international 
                                                 
9  This generally gradual and cautious approach of Nestor Kirchner is even labelled as the “Washington 
Consensus without Convertibility” by many commentators (Wylde, 2010: 4). 
10  Those social policies cover a social security reform that extended access to the unemployed and 
informal sector workers, the Universal Child Subsidy, a conditional cash transfer program that covered 
30 percent of those under 18, larger inclusion of older Argentines in the pension system, heavy 
investment in public works, greater funding for public education and scientific search, and creation 
and/or increase of pension benefits and family allowances (Calvo and Murillo, 2012). 
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contexts, which in turn directly impacted on her approach to the socio-economic 
matters. As the worsening global economic conditions in the wake of the Great 
Recession led to a remarkable decrease in international demand, alongside a fall in 
the international commodity prices, the Argentine export-driven growth model was 
severely affected (Wylde, 2016: 337). Added to the turbulent international economy 
were other serious issues, such as ongoing negotiations with international creditors, 
increasing inflation and declining fiscal surplus (Wylde, 2010: 19). 
However, the most serious incident that happened during Cristina Fernandez 
de Kirchner’s presidency was the 2008 farmers’ rebellion. On 10 March 2008, 
President Kirchner used her executive powers to enact a price-adjusted export tariff 
(retenciones) for key soybean products, such as soy, maize, wheat and sunflower, 
which would mean increasing tax rates as the international commodity prices rise. 
This decision caused a nearly four-month nation-wide conflict between the 
agricultural manufacturers and the Kirchner government, which saw the main roads 
to ports and cities blocked by the farmers (Calvo and Murillo, 2012; Richardson, 
2009; Wylde, 2016). Consequently, President Kirchner had to renounce this new 
system of taxation for export products. Following this incident, President Kirchner 
went on to be elected again in the 2011 presidential elections. Nevertheless, this 
event is still recalled as the one marking the abandonment by Cristina Fernandez de 
Kirchner of Nestor Kirchner’s rather cautious and pragmatic approach to socio-
economic matters (Wylde, 2016: 337). 
Taken together, as to the socio-economic dimension, Kirchnerism precisely 
represents an overall attempt to return to the classical Peronist roots. However, on 
many accounts, Kirchnerism unexpectedly had some similarities with Menemism 
despite its rhetorical opposition, as explained above. In other words, Kirchnerism 
fits into classical Peronism, in that it placed huge emphasis on state interventionism 
and social justice. However, due to functioning in the established forms of the 
neoliberal state and being constrained by the international forces of neoliberal 
globalization, Kirchnerism had marked similarities with Menemism contrary to 
general expectations (Wylde, 2016: 338-9).  
4.2.3. Organizational-leadership dimension of Kirchnerism  
Contrary to the previous two dimensions, the organizational-leadership 
dimension of Kirchnerism generally followed in the footsteps of both classical 
Peronism and Menemism. Like Peron and Menem, Nestor Kirchner generally 
favored a personalized and centralized leadership style. This translated into 
President Nestor Kirchner taking many day-to-day decisions himself and ruling 
often through presidential decrees (Wylde, 2014: 213), rather than through the 
channel of the Congress or other institutions of horizontal accountability (Levitsky 
and Murillo, 2008: 19). 
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Likewise, in order to consolidate his personal control over Peronism’s vast 
but fractious party machine, Nestor Kirchner increasingly outmanoeuvred potential 
rivals within Peronism (Roberts, 2007: 12). In line with the ‘transversality’ strategy, 
Nestor Kirchner even went beyond political party differences by drawing support 
from the Radicals, the Socialists and the Communists via his electoral bloc, the FPV 
(Frente para la Victoria – Front for Victory). 
Though dropping the transversality strategy at the start of her second 
presidential term, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner maintained the personalistic and 
centralized leadership style of her predecessor to a greater extent. As the Argentine 
economy deteriorated, those tendencies of President Kirchner caused rising tension 
in the relations with the labor and business sectors, however. 
Despite those minor differences between two phases of Kirchnerism, thus it 
is possible to argue that both presidents consistently employed a populist discourse 
during their terms. In this respect, contrasting ‘the people’ with ‘the elites’, both 
presidents attacked several entities, including the IMF, international creditors, 
multinational oil corporations and the military (Iglesias, 2015; Levitsky and 
Murillo, 2008; Richardson, 2009). To be sure, as part of the internal power struggle 
within Peronism, Menemism was also targeted by Kirchnerism per se (Aytaç and 
Öniş, 2014: 44).     
5. Conclusion 
Looking from a historical perspective, Peronism has always occupied a 
special place among other cases of populism in South America. Developing under 
the impact of the peculiar conditions of Argentina, Peronism has proven successful 
in adapting itself to changing circumstances. As a reflection of this, classical 
Peronism, Menemism and Kirchnerism succeeded each other as the classical 
populist, neopopulist and radical populist variants of Peronism, respectively. 
Designating political sovereignty, economic independence and social justice 
as its primary pillars, classical Peronism placed huge emphasis on the political 
incorporation of the excluded social masses, such as the organized labor, the poor 
and the dispossessed. On the socio-economic level, classical Peronism rested on the 
historic alliance between industrialists and workers. Relatedly, the strategy of 
national developmentalism led the classical Peronist administration to apply several 
social programs that radically transformed the social fabric. Applying the formula 
of top-down political mobilization by a charismatic leader, classical Peronism 
polarized its societal support base against “the elite”. 
As the neopopulist form of Peronism, Menemism marks a rather neoliberal 
turn in the Peronist tradition, which was fed by the symbiotic relationship between 
neoliberalism and populism. Politically, the political deinstitutionalization of the 
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Menem governments accelerated the imposition of the neoliberal market 
adjustment reforms from above. In line with neoliberalism, Menemism appealed to 
the politically demobilized and unorganized labor in the informal sector, even at the 
expense of damaging the traditional Peronist alliance of industrialists-workers. 
Moreover, the neoliberal economic project of Menemism mainly relied on market 
liberalization, trade liberalization and privatization. Concerning the organizational-
leadership dimension, Menemism did not radically diverge from the traditional 
Peronist line of personalist leadership but mainly sought to promote and justify the 
neoliberal market reforms whilst pitting “the people” against the “power bloc”.  
In light of these points, Kirchnerism surfaced as a reaction to the neoliberal 
practices of Menemism in the early-1990s, so represented the radical populist 
variant of Peronism in the Argentine context. As revealed by its main premises, 
Kirchnerism attempted to reclaim classical Peronism by designating itself as a back-
to-basics movement, following the collapse of Menemism as a neoliberal 
experiment within the Peronist tradition. To this end, Kirchnerism frequently 
highlighted the justicialist legacy of classical Peronism as its main historical 
reservoir, whilst simultaneously denouncing the neoliberal legacy of Menemism. 
However, due to a variety of reasons, the Kirchnerist opposition against Menemism 
at times remained rhetorical at best, as revealed by crucial similarities between these 
two in practice.  
The primary goal of constituting a political alternative to the predominant 
neoliberal model led Kirchnerism to predicate its political agenda on three pillars 
of traditional Peronism, including political independence, economic sovereignty 
and social justice. In a complementary manner, the Kirchnerist governments aimed 
to pull the Peronist movement back to its nationalist and statist roots after the era 
of Menemism. Nonetheless, despite its harsh opposition to Menemism, 
Kirchnerism could not totally be isolated from the political impact of the neoliberal 
order. This is because even the political model it offered emerged within and was 
primarily influenced by neoliberalism. 
In an effort to solve a broad range of socio-economic problems in the post-
crisis Argentina, the Kirchnerist neo-developmentalist model committed itself to 
economic recovery, alongside reducing poverty and inequality. In line with this 
strategy, the historic Peronist coalition of industrialists-workers was given huge 
emphasis, along with ensuring the support of the informal sector workers, the 
unemployed and the poor through various social support schemes. Nevertheless, as 
one of the common aspects with Menemism, Kirchnerism also appealed to the 
middle-class groups, not least as a result of the consumer boom provided by the 
macroeconomic stabilization program. 
In the context of its anti-neoliberal economic policy agenda, Kirchnerism 
practiced a pro-labor strategy for economic growth based on selective 
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protectionism, state interventionism and nationalization, alongside huge 
expenditure in public works and a range of public subsidies. This strategy, 
combined with eligible international circumstances, yielded remarkable post-crisis 
growth in Argentina until the Great Recession. However, President Nestor 
Kirchner’s obvious emphasis on macroeconomic stability, along with avoiding 
hyperinflationary and balance-of-payments crises, points to another similarity with 
Menemism. Added to this was the shared belief in the salience of the export-
oriented growth model for the Argentine economy. Moreover, contrary to the 
clientelist social support network of classical Peronism, Kirchnerism maintained 
the Menemist tradition of the safety-net model of social welfare, which targeted the 
worst manifestations of poverty through conditional cash transfers. Put simply, its 
huge emphasis on state interventionism and social justice drew Kirchnerism closer 
to classical Peronism; but its functioning within the constraints of the national and 
global forms of neoliberalism produced undeniable similarities with the Menemist 
model in practice. 
Regarding the organizational-leadership dimension, Kirchnerism preserved 
the personalized and centralized leadership style that also prevailed during classical 
Peronism and Menemism. However, in terms of contrasting “the people” with “the 
elites”, Nestor and Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner targeted a wide range of entities, 
including the IMF, international creditors, multinational oil corporations and the 
military. 
In sum, despite facing many challenges and obstacles along the road, 
Peronism has always managed to return, as proven once again by the election of 
Alberto Fernandez as the new president. For the past two decades, it has been 
Kirchnerism that dominated the political landscape in Argentina. Given the 
durability and ideological flexibility of Peronism, though, it would not be a surprise 
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280 Uğur Tekiner 
Özet 
Yeniden köklere dönüş mü?  
Geleneksel Peronizm’i geri kazanma girişimi olarak Kirchnerizm 
 
Bu makale, Kirchnerizm’in nasıl ortaya çıktığını ve ardından 2000'lerin başından bu yana 
Peronizm’in en güçlü kolu olarak Arjantin siyasetine nasıl hakim olduğunu incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. 
Peronizm ve Menemizm’in siyasi, sosyo-ekonomik ve örgütsel liderlik niteliklerinin tahliline dayanan bu 
çalışmanın ana argümanı, merkez sol gündemiyle Kirchnerizm’in, 1990’larda Peronizm’in neoliberal bir 
yorumu olarak ortaya çıkan Menemizm’in aksine, siyasal egemenlik, ekonomik bağımsızlık ve sosyal 
adalet gibi temel unsurlarına vurgu yaparak geleneksel Peronizm’i canlandırmayı amaçladığıdır. Bununla 
birlikte, Kirchnerizm’in Menemizm karşıtlığı, uygulamada her ikisi arasında ortaya çıkan önemli 
benzerliklerin de ortaya koyduğu gibi zaman zaman retorik düzeyde kalmıştır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Arjantin siyaseti, Kirchnerizm, Menemizm, Peronizm, Latin Amerika'da popülizm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
